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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FIRST EQUITY CORPORATION, a
Florida corporation,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, a body
politic and corporate,

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Defendant-Respondent,

PETITION FOR
REHEARING
AND BRIEF

)

and

)

DONALD A. CATRON, an individual,

)

Defendant.

)

Appellant First Equity Corporation respectfully petitions
the Court for a Rehearing of the appeal in the above-captioned
case on the following grounds:
The opinion of the Court, filed December 23, 1975, does not
deal with a major issue considered by the court below and raised
on appeal, namely, whether or not non-appropriated, non-public
funds in the possession of USU could legally have been used for
investment in common stock, thus rendering the University's con-

tracts with its agent First Equity not ultra vires.
DATED this 26th day of January, 1976.
JOHNSON & SPACKMAN

By c ^ W t ^ ? / / y - MJtdatn
Christine M. Durham
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Certify I hand delivered a true and exact copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing and Brief to the Office of the
Attorney General, Utah State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah, this 26th day of January, 1976.
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Christine M. Durham
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

FIRST EQUITY CORPORATION, a Florida
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, a body politic
and corporate,
Defendant-Respondent,

CASE NO. 13798

and
DONALD A. CATRON, an individual,
Defendant.

APPELLANTS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because of the extensive treatment of the facts heretofore
presented in this appeal, Appellant respectfully refers the Court
to its own summary of the facts in the first five paragraphs of the
Court's Opinion filed on December 23, 1975, and to the Statement of
Facts contained in pages 2-12 of Appellant's Brief filed prior to
oral argument before this Court.
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE OPINION OF THIS COURT FILED ON DECEMBER 23. 1975. DOES NOT
TREAT A MAJOR ISSUE RAISED BY THIS APPEAL IN REGARD TO THE POWER OF
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY TO INVEST NON-APPROPRIATED. NON-PUBLIC FUNDS
IN SECURITIES OTHER THAN THOSE LISTED IN SECTION 33-1-1. UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED (1953). AND A REHEARING ON THAT QUESTION IS APPROPRIATE
AND NECESSARY.
The opinion filed by this Court in the appeal brought by First
Equity specifically states: "[ t]he direct question presented here
is whether or not Utah State University is empowered to invest in
common stock with public funds."

It appears that the Court ruled,

on that question without considering the issues raised in the arguments and briefs on appeal as to the lawfulness of investments in
common stock with funds from private, non-public sources.

The

opinion further indicates that "USU has no specific designated
power from the Constitution or the Legislature to invest its funds
in securities outside those declared lawful by Section 33-1-1 and
investments in common stock are ultra vires acts."

In light of the

fact that the opinion does not discuss specifically those statutes
which indicate a power to invest non-appropriated funds in common
stock, it is appropriate for the Court to grant a rehearing on that
question.

Further, if this Court determines that any funds, regard-

less of their limited nature, could have been used by the University
to purchase common stock, the Orders of the Court below must be
reversed.
-2-

POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY'S
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
HAD POWER TO INVEST FUNDS RECEIVED FROM INDIVIDUAL GRANTS OR DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS IN COMMON STOCK, AND ITS CONTRACTS WITH FIRST
EQUITY WERE THEREFORE NOT ULTRA VIRES.
Respondent Utah State University has argued in this appeal
that prior to the enactment of Section 33-1-1 in 1939, the Universities and other public corporations had no power to invest their
funds in anything in the absence of another specific code section
detailing a permissible investment.
page 9.

See Respondent's Reply Brief,

In support of that contention, Respondent refers to a

1936 opinion from the Utah Attorney General to the State Auditor
to the effect that public monies, except for redemption funds,
could not be legally invested in anything, but had to be deposited
in selected banks.

Appellant does not doubt the existence or con-

tents of that opinion, or that it may have been motivated in part
by a reaction to depressed economic conditions, as Respondent suggests in a footnote.

However, Appellant points out that the opinion

was clearly in conflict with a statute in full force and effect in
1936, which had been enacted eight years earlier.

Section 53-32-4,

Utah Code Annotated (1953) specifically provides in part:
The Utah State Agricultural College [the University]
in its corporate capacity may take by purchase, grant,
gift, devise or bequest any property, real or personal
for the use of any department of the college and for
any purpose appropriate to the objects of the college.
-3-

It may convert property received by gift, grant,
devise or bequest and not suitable for its uses
into other property so available or into money.
Such property so received or converted shall be
held, invested or managed and the proceeds thereof used by the board of trustees for the purposes
and under the conditions prescribed in the grant
or donation. [Emphasis added]
The University was thus given the power to receive "any property, real or personal11, to convert that property into money, and
to invest and manage it.

In the absence of any legislative restric-

tion upon the broad power to invest funds from the described sources,
there clearly can be no limitation on the University's power to
invest such funds in common stock.

The opinion of the Attorney

General in 1936 notwithstanding, legislative authority to invest
non-appropriated funds is indisputable from the language of the
statute, which has not been repealed at any time since.

In 1974,

the Utah Legislature did place, for the first time, restrictions
on the types of common stock that could be purchased with certain
non-appropriated funds, in the State Money Management Act of February 2, 1974, Section 51-7-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953),
which afforded different treatment to funds from private, contract,
or auxiliary enterprise sources and so-called "public funds .
That the opinion of the Utah Attorney General that the University 's funds could not be invested in anything in 1936 was in
error is evidenced by a 1972 opinion prepared for the State Auditor
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by the Attorney General s office.

That letter opinion is part of

the Record in this case, being attached as Exhibit C to the Answers
of Utah State University to Interrogatories of Donald A. Catron,
R. 151. The opinion was a response to questions from the accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst, which had been retained by the State
Auditor for auditing purposes.

One of the questions discussed was

"what investments are authorized by law for [funds pooled from free
cash balances of various University funds for investment purposes J
The response quotes that portion of Section 53-32-4, Utah Code
Annotated (1953) referred to above, and states:
. . . [I]t is our opinion that the most reasonable
interpretation to be given is to conclude that
[Section 53-32-4] is in harmony with Sections 33-1-1
and 33-1-3 and permits the University to invest funds
derived from grants, gifts, devises or bequests in
such securities or other properties as it deems fit
or as the donor may specify.
Even if the Higher Education Act, in Section 53-48-20, Utah
Code Annotated, was intended to authorize only those investments
specified in Section 33-1-1, as the above-referenced opinion indicates, (but which question certainly remains open in light of the
statutory language of the later Act) such an intent can hardly be
attributed to the 1929 Legislature which authorized the investment
of certain classes of funds ten years before Section 33-1-1 was
enacted.

The language of the 1929 statute, unless it is to be

regarded as meaningless and mere surplusage, clearly evidences a

legislative intent to permit investment of certain funds within
the discretion of the University Trustees for the furtherance of
the purposes of the institution and in accord with the wishes and
instructions of donors.

In this context, Sendak v. The Trustees

of Indiana University, 260 N.E.2d 601 (1970), a case decided in
1970 by the Indiana Supreme Court and discussed at length by amici
curiae in their brief in this appeal, becomes very significant.
That case held that the members of the Board of Trustees of Indiana
University act in dual capacities as Directors of University operations (and thus administrators of public monies appropriated for
those purposes ) and as common law Trustees of private trusts
created by private donors for the benefit of the University.

In

construing statutes very similar to Section 53-32-4, Utah Code
Annotated (1953),* the court in Sendak concluded that the State of

*The statutes in question are quoted in the body of the majority
opinion as follows:
The legislature of the State of Indiana has officially
recognized Indiana University as a state university, and
at the same time by Act has made the Board of Trustees,
under the style of "Trustees of Indiana University11, a
body politic, which may sue and be sued and with authority
to manage the state university. Burns1 Ind. Stat. Anno.§
28-5302. The Board of Trustees has in addition been given
the special statutory power n to accept gifts, bequests and
devises of personal and real property for the maintenance,
use and benefit of Indiana University . . . or to be administered for other public charitable purposes for the
benefit or use of the students of any such educational
institutions.11 Burns1 Inc. Stat. Anno.§ 28-5712. Further,
-6-

Indiana did not own the gifts given by private donors to the University of Indiana Board of Trustees, and that the Board could invest such funds in common stock.
The court here stated:
The property with which we are concerned was not given
to the state of Indiana. Thus, the State of Indiana is
not the owner of the gifts from the private donors to
the trustees. They were given in trust upon certain
limitations and specifications. To say that they became the property of the State of Indiana would be a
violation of the trust imposed upon the trustees pursuant to the statute under which they are authorized
to accept such funds. The trustees have a duty and
obligation, as trustees have in a private trust, to use
good judgment and prudence in the management of the
funds entrusted to them and to keep them properly and
prudently invested, with due regard to enhancing the
income, as far as the same may reasonably and safely
be done. The mere fact that the trustees happen to
act in another capacity and are a corporate body affected
with a public interest does not prohibit them from also
acting as trustees of private funds, particularly in
this case, where the statute specifically authorizes

Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. §28-5713 gives the trustees
the right to ". . . administer and use any property
transferred to them by gift, bequest, or devise, with
such terms and conditions, and with such obligations,
liability and burdens as are imposed thereon. . .ff
[260 N.E.2d at 602]
Also in question was a provision of the Indiana State Constitution, Article II, Section 12, which reads: MThe State shall not
be a stockholder in any bank . . .; nor shall the credit of the State
ever be given, or loaned, in aid of any person, association or corporation; nor shall the State hereafter become a stockholder in any
corporation or association.[Emphasis added]
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such activity. It is true that the property here
involved has certain public or charitable purposes,
but that does not make the State of Indiana the owner
of such funds any more than the State of Indiana is the
owner of funds placed in trust with some other private
trustee for the same purposes, namely, educational
purposes at Indiana University. [260 N.E. 2d at 603]
The Utah Legislature made it clear in 1929 that it intended
the Board of Trustees to use the proceeds of private gifts, bequests
and trusts in a manner consonant with the conditions imposed by the
donors thereof, as the Sendak court held was the case in Indiana.
It is significant that in 1974, when the Utah Legislature undertook
a major revision of the fiscal management statutes of Utah

lf

(a) To

safeguard and protect deposits of public funds by providing qualifications for depositories of these funds; (b) to establish and
maintain a continuing statewide policy for the deposit and investment of public funds,11 in the State Money Management Act, that it
did not amend or repeal Section 53-32-4.

Moreover, it afforded

funds from private sources the same treatment, more complete and
detailed, than it had previously.

Section 51-7-13 deals with the

funds of member institutions of the state system of higher education and provides as follows:
(b) All funds acquired by gift, devise, or bequest,
or by federal or private grant shall be invested in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the council unless the terms of the gift or grant provide otherwise, in which event these funds shall be invested and
managed in accordance with the standards specified in
Section 33-2-1.
-8-

Section 33-2-1 deals with the judgment and care to be exercised by
fiduciaries, and specifically authorizes the acquisition, retention
and management of

f,

every kind of investment, . . . including stocks,

preferred or common. . . ." Although the 1974 Money Management
Act specifically amended and repealed a number of prior statutes,
it did not amend or repeal Section 53-32-4; for it did not alter
its provisions but merely made them more complete and detailed.
If this Court agrees with Appellant that the University did
have power at least from 1929 to use funds from private sources to
invest in common stock, it follows that Utah State University's
contracts with First Equity were not ultra vires, and that Appellant
is entitled to recovery pursuant to those contracts.
POINT III
FIRST EQUITY HAD NO OBLIGATION TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT
THE FUNDS USED BY UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY TO PURCHASE STOCK WERE
LAWFULLY AVAILABLE FOR INVESTMENT, IF ANY FUNDS WHATSOEVER IN
THE UNIVERSITY'S POSSESSION WERE AVAILABLE.
The lower court in this case denied First Equity's Motion for
Summary Judgment because it concluded that an issue of fact was
raised as to whether sufficient non-appropriated funds were available for Utah State University to purchase the stock in question.
(R. 435B)

The Order in which the court denied that motion said in

relevant part:
1. Utah State University had no statutory power
to invest public funds in common stock and that

-9-

contracts to purchase stock with public funds
are void;
2. There is at least a triable issue of fact
whether Utah State University at the time Catron
ordered the stock in question or the time payment
for said stock fell due, had funds which it had
received from individual grants or development
contracts sufficient to pay for part or all of
said stock;
That Order was prepared from a Memorandum Decision filed by
the court below in which it held that Sections 53-48-10(5) and
53-48-20(3) do "not change the effect of [ Sections 33-1-1 and
33-1-3, Utah Code Annotated] with the possible exception of funds
received by the institution from individual grants or development
contracts.11

Thus the court below recognized as a possibility what

Appellants contend here is a fact:

that the University could in-

vest certain non-appropriated funds in its possession in common
stock.

However, Appellant claims further that the Order below was

still in error, since the possession of funds "sufficient to pay
for all or part of said stock" is wholly irrelevant if the University had power to purchase such stock with any funds, thus rendering
its contracts with First Equity not ultra vires, and legitimately
enforceable.

The University, as shown herein, had authority to

invest certain funds from private sources in common stock.

That

being the case, any contract entered into between Utah State University and First Equity was not ultra vires, and First Equity
^
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was not required to inquire or take steps to determine whether
lawful or unlawful funds were being used for the investments in
question.

The Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act, Section 21-1-1 et.

seqt< Utah Code Annotated, provides as follows:
"Fiduciary1 includes a trustee under any trust,
expressed, implied, resulting or constructive,
executor, administrator, guardian, conservator,
curator, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee
for the benefit of creditors, partners, agent, officer of a corporation, public or private, public
officer, and any other person acting in a fiduciary
capacity for any person, trust or estate. [ Emphasis
added ]
It is clear that this definition would include Donald Catron
as an officer of Utah State University when he was purchasing common stock on behalf of the University through the Appellant and
other brokerage firms.
The operative portion of the Act, Utah Code Annotated,
Section 22-1-5 (1953) says:
If a check or other bill of exchange is drawn by
a fiduciary as such, or in the name of his principal
by a fiduciary empowered to draw such instrument in
the name of his principal, the payee is not bound to
inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach
of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice
that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary, unless he takes the instrument
with actual knowledge of such breach or with knowledge
of such facts that his action in taking the instrument
amounts to bad faith . . . [ Emphasis added]
Thus, if the underlying contracts to purchase stock were not
ultra vires, because Utah State University had power to purchase

-i i .

common stock with some of its funds, First Equity had no responsibility to ascertain the source of funds for any particular stock
purchase.

Likewise, the actual existence of enough non-appropriated

funds to purchase stock ordered would not be a relevant issue of
fact, since a valid contract is enforceable regardless of whether
or not one of the parties has sufficient funds to meet its legitimate contractual obligations,

To hold otherwise is to suggest that

a debtor is excused from his legal obligations at whatever point he
ceases to have sufficient funds on hand to meet them.

The court

below therefore erred in denying First Equity's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

And it also clearly erred in ordering Utah State Univer-

sity's Cross Motion be granted on the ground that First Equity's
claim is "barred by the provisions of the Utah Code prohibiting
the investment by state employees of funds in their custody in
securities other than those enumerated in Utah Code Annotated,
Section 33-1-1" when it had not ruled on the possibility recognized
by its own Memorandum Decision that not all funds were so restricted
by Section 33-1-1, but that certain non-public funds were not affected by those restrictions.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully urges this Court to reconsider the
original Opinion filed in this appeal, and to rule that at least
some of the non-public funds in Utah State University's possession,
-. -:
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namely those described in Section 53-32-4 at the least and possibly
also those described in Section 53-48-20(3), were available for
investments of a wider scope than those indicated in Section 33-1-1.
Such a ruling will require a reversal of both Orders of the court
below.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHNSON & SPACKMAN

By:

Norman S. Johnson
Christine M. Durham
Randall P. Spackman
Attorneys for Appellant
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